

***Brief for the  
Secretary of Defense  
on Gaps and Seams***

Vice Admiral Tom Church III, USN  
19 August 04

# Tasking


*“ ...ensure all areas of concern to the Department of Defense regarding detention operations are being addressed adequately and expeditiously. (And) **report to me any gaps or seams** among those review and investigations.”*

SECDEF Memo of 25 May 04

# Assumptions

- Ongoing reviews (Jones/Fay, Formica, Jacoby and Schlesinger) report out as expected.
- An office (to be designated) will assume responsibility for tracking progress of actions identified in this brief.
- Some gaps will not be completely addressed.
  - Ability of ongoing investigations to sufficiently address issues to the satisfaction of some interests
  - Definitive “ghost detainee” accountability
  - DoD sensitive support to Other Government Agencies (OGAs)

# Gaps and Seams



- 61 - Action Initiated
- 16 - Action Not Initiated or Pending Decision



# Policy/Force Structure Issues

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Lead</u>	<u>Status</u>
<b>1. Oversight and Governance of Detainee Ops</b> - Need permanent leadership to manage change and improvements	USD(P)	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
<b>2. Law of War Treaties</b> - Geneva and Hague Conventions' applicability to Global War on Terrorism - Harmonizing policies and treaties with allies	OGC	<input type="radio"/>
<b>3. Policy Documents</b> - Review and revise overarching policy documents to include DoD Directives and Instructions and Law of Land Warfare (FM 27-10) and Tri-service Regulations (AR 190-8)	USD(P)	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
<b>4. Force Structure</b> - Review Active / Reserve / Guard / Contractor mix for MP / MI capabilities - Review language skill requirements - Revisit Special Operations Forces capabilities and manning requirements	Dept of the Army	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
<b>5. Defense HUMINT Services (DHS)</b> - Study in progress to review DHS ability to meet future requirements based on lessons learned	USD(I)	<input checked="" type="radio"/>

Action Initiated

Action not Initiated  
or Pending Decision



# Policy/Force Structure Issues

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Lead</u>	<u>Status</u>
<b>6. Medical</b> - Formalize role of medical personnel in detainee ops - Update detainee autopsy policy	ASD(HA)	●
<b>7. Early Notification of Significant Events</b> - What changes have been made to ensure appropriate notification of abuse incidents, at the highest levels, in the future?	DA&M	●
<b>8. Partial Immunity Program</b> - Develop limited program designed to encourage disclosure of any remaining abuses	OGC	●


● Action Initiated

○ Action not Initiated or Pending Decision



# Doctrine Issues

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Lead</u>	<u>Status</u>
<b>1. Develop Joint Doctrine for Detainee Ops</b> - Working on several pubs (e.g., Air Land Sea Application Center Multiservice Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, Joint Pub 3-63 Joint Detainee Operations, Joint Pub 2-01.2)	<b>Joint Staff</b>	
<b>2. Coalition Doctrine for Detainee Ops</b> - Need to develop doctrine for coalition operations	<b>Joint Staff</b>	


 Action Initiated

 Action not Initiated or Pending Decision






# Legal Issues

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Lead</u>	<u>Status</u>
<b>1. Review of Manual for Courts-Martial and UCMJ</b> <i>- Review for adequacy with respect to detainee abuse (similar to post-Aberdeen)</i>	<b>Service JAGs</b>	
<b>2. Service Responsibilities Under Goldwater - Nichols</b> <i>- Review COCOM responsibilities regarding detention operations to include investigation and prosecution of alleged abuses</i>	<b>Services/ Joint Staff</b>	


 Action Initiated

 Action not Initiated or Pending Decision

# Process Issues

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Lead</u>	<u>Status</u>
<b>1. Detainee Tracking System</b> <i>- Develop a centralized detainee tracking and reporting system that captures essential data (e.g., retinal scan, finger prints, correct name and spelling and DNA) that is compatible with existing law enforcement and intelligence data bases</i>	<b>Dept of the Army</b>	
<b>2. Establish DoD Ombudsman or other OSD Oversight Mechanism</b>	<b>USD(P)</b>	
<b>3. Mobilization Process</b> <i>- Review sufficiency in light of recent operations</i>	<b>USD(P&amp;R)</b>	
<b>4. ICRC Process</b> <i>- Formalize processing, review and reporting of ICRC contacts</i>	<b>USD(P)</b>	
<b>5. Review and Release Procedure for Declassifying Detainee Operations (e.g., Interrogation Documentation)</b> <i>- Declassified GTMO documentation</i> <i>- GTMO briefs to Congress</i> <i>- Appropriately classify documentation</i> <i>- Maintain and take action on documents once classified</i>	<b>USD(I)</b>	

 Action Initiated

 Action not Initiated or Pending Decision

# Process Issues

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Lead</u>	<u>Status</u>
<p><b>6. Complete On-going Senior Investigations</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Miller Report (Completed 09 Sept 03)</li> <li>- Ryder Report (Completed 06 Nov 03)</li> <li>- Taguba Report (Completed 09 Mar 04)</li> <li>- Church GTMO Report (Completed 11 Mar 04)</li> <li>- Army Inspector General Report (Completed 22 Jul 04)</li> <li>- Formica Report (Signed 08 Aug 04)</li> <li>- Jacoby Report (Aug 04)</li> <li>- Fay / Jones / Kern Report (Aug 04)</li> <li>- Independent Panel (Aug 04)</li> <li>- Church Report (Estimated Completion Sep 04)</li> <li>- Army Reserve Inquiry (Estimated Completion Nov 04)</li> </ul>		●
<p><b>7. Update All Instructions Related to Detainee Operations</b></p>	DA&M	●
<p><b>8. Completion of All Criminal Investigations of Detainee Abuse</b></p>	Depts of the Army & Navy	●

● Action Initiated

○ Action not Initiated or Pending Decision



# Process Issues

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Lead</u>	<u>Status</u>
<p><b>9. Capture Lessons Learned for OEF and OIF Relating to Detainee Ops (Representative list)</b></p> <p><i>a. Which interrogation techniques were effective?</i></p> <p><i>b. Which interrogation techniques possibly led to abuse?</i></p> <p><i>c. What other factors led to abuse?</i></p> <p><i>d. Where was valued intelligence gained—point of capture to detainee center?</i></p> <p><i>e. Performance of in lieu of/ad hoc organizations</i></p> <p><i>f. Accuracy of media reporting</i></p> <p><i>g. Impact on soldiers of Abu Ghraib incident and follow-on investigations and reviews on troops</i></p> <p><i>h. Review range of disciplinary measures taken against US forces with regard to detainee abuse</i></p> <p><i>i. Organization. Did combining elements (e.g., a CFLCC, Army Corps and MEF) work?</i></p> <p><i>j. Title X issues (Operations, Equipment and Training)</i></p> <p><i>k. Investigation reporting process (COCOM situational awareness)</i></p>	<p>JFCOM</p>	<p><input type="radio"/></p>

Action Initiated

Action not Initiated or Pending Decision





# Congress

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Lead</u>	<u>Status</u>
All issues listed here also of interest to the media.		
<p><b>4. Legal Concerns</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Did additional techniques get adequate legal review and are they humane?</li> <li>- Was SECDEF made aware of senior department OGC and JAG concerns?</li> <li>- Do the Geneva Conventions apply precisely in Iraq?</li> <li>- Did we apply lessons learned from previous conflicts (e.g., Bosnia) to the current insurgency?</li> </ul>	<p>SCH</p> <p>C</p> <p>USD(P)</p> <p>C</p>	<p>●</p> <p>●</p> <p>●</p> <p>○</p>
<p><b>5. Policy, Guidance and Doctrine</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- At what senior level were interrogation procedures approved?</li> <li>- Were interrogation policies adequately disseminated and enforced?</li> <li>- Did MG Miller's visit lead to policy that resulted in abuse?</li> <li>- Does Army doctrine clearly delineate the roles of MPs and Mis?</li> </ul>	<p>C</p> <p>C/J</p> <p>C/FJK</p> <p>DAIG</p>	<p>●</p> <p>●</p> <p>●</p> <p>●</p>

C – Church Report	● Action Initiated	○ Action not Initiated or Pending Decision
DAIG – Army IG Report		
FJK – Fay/Jones/Kern Report		
J – Jacoby Report		
SCH – Schlesinger Independent Panel		

# Congress

<u>Issue</u> All issues listed here also of interest to the media.	<u>Lead</u>	<u>Status</u>
<b>6. ICRC</b> - At what senior level were Abu Ghraib ICRC reports reviewed? * To whom was the November 2003 ICRC report addressed and what actions were taken? - Do we hide prisoners or detain them without record? - Has the Department of Defense now addressed outstanding ICRC reports?	C  C  FJK/C/ SCH  C	●  ●  ●  ●
<b>7. OGA</b> - What role did OGAs play in DoD interrogations? - What role did DoD play in OGA interrogations? - Do OGA interrogators adhere to DoD interrogation rules? - What is a "ghost detainee" and how many have there been?	C  C  C  Gap	●  ●  ●  ●

C – Church Report

FJK – Fay/Jones/Kern Report

SCH – Schlesinger Independent Panel

● Action Initiated

○ Action not Initiated or Pending Decision

# Congress

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Lead</u>	<u>Status</u>
All issues listed here also of interest to the media.		
<b>8. Civilian Contractors</b> <i>- Is it appropriate to have contractors conducting DoD interrogations?</i> <i>- Are contractors bound by DoD interrogation rules?</i> <i>- Is current legal construct sufficient to hold contractors accountable for their actions?</i>	<b>Dept of the Army</b>	●
	<b>DAIG/C</b>	●
	<b>DAIG/C</b>	●
<b>9. Relationship between MPs and MIs</b> <i>- Did the transfer of tactical control at Abu Ghraib blur lines of responsibility in the prison?</i> <i>- What role did MI have in the abusive activities in Abu Ghraib?</i> <i>- Was MG Miller's recommendation for MPs to "set conditions for successful interrogation" inconsistent with Army doctrine?</i>	<b>FJK/T</b>	●
	<b>FJK</b>	●
	<b>DAIG</b>	●

C – Church Report  
 DAIG – Army IG Report  
 FJK – Fay/Jones/Kern Report  
 T – Taguba Report

● Action Initiated      ○ Action not Initiated or Pending Decision

# Congress

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Lead</u>	<u>Status</u>
All issues listed here also of interest to the media.		
<b>10. Force Structure and Training</b> - Did DoD plan and equip appropriately for this mission and is force structure adequate to meet GWOT requirements? - Is our MI/MP force structure sufficient? - Did MI/MP personnel receive the training essential to perform their mission to include training in the Geneva Conventions?	SCH  DAIG DAIG	●  ● ●
<b>11. Intelligence</b> - Did interrogation techniques result in actionable intelligence? - Has the abuse scandal impacted our ability to get good intelligence?	SCH  DAIG/C	●  ●

C – Church Report

DAIG – Army IG Report

SCH – Schlesinger Independent Panel

● Action Initiated

○ Action not Initiated or Pending Decision

# Media

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Lead</u>	<u>Status</u>
Other areas of interest covered in Congressional section.		
<b>1. Theory/Policy</b> - <i>How is torture defined? Do expanded techniques constitute torture?</i> - <i>Will the Office of Detainee Affairs approve interrogation techniques?</i> - <i>Is the use of military dogs in interrogations authorized under Geneva Conventions?</i>	OGC  TBD  FJK/J/ SCH	●  ○  ●
<b>2. Unit Level Procedures</b> - <i>Did interrogation plans include unapproved interrogation techniques?</i> - <i>What role does the Initial Reaction Force play in interrogations?</i> - <i>Do military interrogators have access to prisoner medical records?</i> - <i>Did analysts perform interrogations due to manning shortfalls?</i> - <i>Did leadership approve the use of dogs for interrogations?</i> - <i>Were different types of detainees (High-Value Detainees, Security Detainees, etc.) subject to different types of techniques?</i>	C/J/ FJK  C  C  C  C/J/ FJK C/FJK	●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●

C – Church Report  
 FJK – Fay/Jones/Kern Report  
 J – Jacoby Report  
 SCH – Schlesinger Independent Panel

● Action Initiated

○ Action not Initiated or Pending Decision

# Media

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Lead</u>	<u>Status</u>
Other areas of interest covered in Congressional section.		
<b>3. SOF</b> - <i>What role did SOF play in interrogations?</i> - <i>Are SOF forces authorized more aggressive interrogation techniques?</i>	C/F/I/J C/I/J	<input checked="" type="radio"/> <input checked="" type="radio"/>
<b>4. Pressure for Intelligence</b> - <i>Was extreme pressure for intelligence put on interrogators to produce actionable intelligence and did this contribute to the abuse?</i>	C/ FJK/ SCH	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
<b>5. Role of Medical Personnel in Abuse</b> - <i>To what extent, if any, did medical personnel participate in or fail to report alleged abuse?</i>	C/ FJK	<input type="radio"/>

C – Church Report

F – Formica Report

FJK – Fay/Jones/Kern Report

J – Jacoby Report

SCH – Schlesinger Independent Panel

Action Initiated

Action not Initiated  
or Pending Decision



# Investigation Inconsistencies

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Lead</u>	<u>Status</u>
<p><b>1. Relationship between MPs and MIs</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Taguba and Ryder disagree, from a doctrine perspective, with Miller's recommendation that MPs set conditions for interrogations.</li> <li>- Taguba disagrees with Ryder's conclusion that 800<sup>th</sup> MP Brigade were not directed to set conditions for successful interrogations.</li> </ul>	<p><b>DAIG/C</b></p> <p><b>FJK</b></p>	<p>●</p> <p>●</p>
<p><b>2. Nature of Abuse</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- DAIG conclusion that abuse was isolated and not systemic does not mirror Taguba's finding of "systemic and illegal abuse of detainees."</li> </ul>	<p><b>C</b></p>	<p>●</p>
<p><b>3. "Ghost Detainees"</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- DAIG report does not directly address Taguba's finding that the 800<sup>th</sup> MP Brigade routinely held "ghost detainees" brought to them by OGAs</li> </ul>	<p><b>C/FJK</b></p>	<p>●</p>

C – Church Report  
 DAIG – Army IG Report  
 FJK – Fay/Jones/Kern Report

● Action Initiated

○ Action not Initiated or Pending Decision

# Investigation Inconsistencies

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Lead</u>	<u>Status</u>
<b>4. Taguba Report Inconsistencies</b> <i>- BG Karpinski disagrees with CJTF7 on her request for additional manpower. (MAJ Weidenbush supports BG Karpinski in letter to several Senators.)</i>	<b>C</b>	●
<b>5. Coordinated Delivery of Reports and Reviews</b> <i>- Completed investigation reports released with limited explanation of their individual tasking as it relates to other senior-level reviews.</i>	<b>OASD(PA)</b>	●

C – Church Report

● Action Initiated

● Action not Initiated or Pending Decision



# Interagency

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Lead</u>	<u>Status</u>
<b>1. Coordination and Harmonization</b> <i>- Task Force to review streamlining interagency process to support GWOT</i>	USD(P)	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
<b>2. Develop Policy for Joint Interagency Detainee Ops</b> <i>- Where multiple agencies (e.g., DoD, FBI, CIA) perform joint / combined interrogations, common guidance is required</i>	USD(P)	<input type="radio"/>

Action Initiated

Action not Initiated  
or Pending Decision

# Additional Initiatives

# Other Initiatives (Army)

<u>Issue</u>		<u>Status</u>
<b>1. Refresher Training with Special Emphasis on Handling of Prisoners and other Detainees</b> <i>- Law of Land Warfare</i> <i>- Geneva and Hague Conventions</i>		●
<b>2. Pre - Deployment MI Reservist Training</b> <i>- Receive most current instruction on their responsibilities</i>		●
<b>3. Updated Training at Combat Training Centers</b> <i>- Military Police and Military Intelligence Mobile Training Teams sent to advanced training centers to update training instructions to include detainee operations</i> <i>- Include detainee and interrogation operations in training scenarios</i>		●

● Action Initiated

○ Action not Initiated or Pending Decision



# Other Initiatives (CENTCOM)

<u>Issue</u>		<u>Status</u>
<p><b>1. Chain of Command</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Streamlined by establishing Deputy Commanding General – Detainee Operations</li> <li>* Responsible for all detention and interrogation operations</li> <li>* Military Police for detention and interrogation support mission</li> <li>* Coordinates with Multinational Force – Iraq (MNF-I)</li> <li>- Command policies regarding internment / resettlement operations briefed and posted</li> </ul>		●
<p><b>2. Accountability</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Criminal and administrative investigation initiated for activities at Abu Ghraib</li> <li>- Seven U.S. Army courts-martial in process</li> <li>- 130+ Army, Navy and Marine Corps criminal investigations underway</li> <li>- Key members of detainee security unit at Abu Ghraib suspended</li> </ul>		●

● Action Initiated


○ Action not Initiated or Pending Decision

# Other Initiatives (CENTCOM)

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Status</u>
<p><b>3. Detention Facilities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Improved force protection measures to protect Coalition forces and detainees</li> <li>- All camps prominently display Geneva Conventions and facility rules in English and detainee languages</li> <li>- Improved overall facility conditions for detainees at Abu Ghraib</li> <li>- Implemented plans to upgrade facilities for Coalition forces and detainees</li> </ul>	
<p><b>4. Detainee Processing</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Increased detainee case file reviewing rate</li> <li>- All detainee transfers are conducted using automated biometric system</li> <li>- Segregating males, females and juveniles within detention facilities</li> </ul>	

 Action Initiated    
  Action not Initiated or Pending Decision

# Other Initiatives (CENTCOM)

<u>Issue</u>		<u>Status</u>
<p><b>5. General Detainee Operations</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Issued orders and command policies reinforcing the Law of War, including the Geneva Conventions</li> <li>- Reissued memo regarding "Proper Treatment of Iraqi People During Combat Operations"</li> <li>- Policy Memorandum Number 18: "Proper Conduct During Combat Ops" <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Emphasized treating all Iraqis and journalists with dignity and respect</li> <li>* Guidance on Law of War and ROE</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Improved detainee operations SOP <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Comprehensive procedures for handling and treatment of detainees in all theater detention facilities</li> <li>* Detention ROE / rules for use of force and principles of Geneva Convention briefed at every shift change and guard mount</li> </ul> </li> </ul>		

● Action Initiated

○ Action not Initiated or Pending Decision

# Other Initiatives (CENTCOM)

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Status</u>
<p><b>6. Training</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Conduct daily training at each guard mount on detention tasks / standards</li> <li>- Document lessons learned in serious incidents and review for future efforts</li> <li>- Mobile Training Teams deployed to assist in training MP and Medical Treatment Teams</li> <li>- Arab cultural training conducted</li> </ul>	●
<p><b>7. Intelligence</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- New system for intelligence fusion decreases information cycle time</li> <li>- Refined transfer criteria support rapid exploitation of high value detainees and release of low value detainees</li> <li>- Assigned Joint Intelligence Task Force – Combating-terrorism personnel at primary interrogation facilities expedite agency counter-terrorism info</li> <li>- Established weekly Interservice Agency Targeting Board to focus HUMINT collection and targeting efforts</li> <li>- Re-prioritize HUMINT requirements</li> <li>- MNF-I assumed responsibilities for all HUMINT collection and analysis</li> </ul>	●

● Action Initiated

○ Action not Initiated or Pending Decision



# Other Initiatives (CENTCOM)

<u>Issue</u>		<u>Status</u>
<b>8. ICRC</b> <i>- Working with Congress and ICRC to establish protocols for sharing ICRC documents</i> <i>- Respond to ICRC concerns</i> <i>- Mandated all ICRC reports and working papers be addressed to Commander MNF-I and designated Judge Advocate</i> <i>- All reports sent via Deputy Commanding General – Detainee Operations to Commander, MNF-I and higher authority ASAP</i>		<input type="radio"/> <input checked="" type="radio"/> <input checked="" type="radio"/> <input checked="" type="radio"/>

Action Initiated

Action not Initiated  
or Pending Decision



# Other Initiatives (SOUTHCOM)

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<u>Issue</u>		<u>Status</u>

- Action Initiated
- Action not Initiated or Pending Decision

**Subject: Applicability of the Geneva Conventions to “Ghost Detainees” in Iraq**

**Purpose.** To provide information about the law applicable to “Ghost Detainees.”

**Key Points.**

- (U) The Geneva Conventions apply to Security Internee (SI) held in Iraq.
- (U) Normally, the ICRC has the right to go to all places where protected persons are detained.
  - However, in certain circumstances, the Geneva Civilian Conventions (GCC, art. 143) allows a Detaining Power to prohibit the ICRC to visit a SI.
    - The reason to deny a visit must be “for reasons of imperative military necessity.”
    - The Detaining Power must determine it to be an exceptional measure and it must only be of a temporary nature.
- (U) The GCC also permits holding a SI who participated in activities hostile to the security of the occupying power if required by “absolute military security.”
  - Specific examples are spies and saboteurs
  - Persons who have committed such acts are considered to have forfeited the rights of communication.
  - This does not release the Detaining Power from its obligation to notify the ICRC of the detention.

(b)(1)





# **DETAINEE SENIOR LEADERSHIP OVERSIGHT COUNCIL**

**Office of Detainee Affairs  
Briefing for all OSD Components**

# F/J-019 Detainee Message

(U) RECOMMENDATION/OBSERVATION

- How do we communicate what were doing to inspire confidence in our soldiers?
- Is the broader message of what happened in the investigations getting out?

(U) CURRENT ASSESSMENT:



- Council needs to decide what is a proper forum/way ahead/ or TF to deal with the problem. USD(P) is willing to coordinate with OSD(PA) once a strategy is developed to execute the strategy.

OPR: OSD(PA)/USD(P)


OCR: USD(P)

**(U) FIX/ACTION/CHANGE:**

**Fix:** Need to better communicate the changes we have made and the actions taken.

**Action:** Develop communications plan?

**Change:**



# S-001 Policy Alignment w/ Geneva

**(U) RECOMMENDATION/OBSERVATION**

- Need to further define policy for DoD and other government agencies to align with Geneva Conventions

**(U//~~FOUO~~) CURRENT ASSESSMENT:**



- Defining policy is “easy” – question is resolving our own internal conflicts over intelligence missions and international perceptions of our legal obligations.
- Priority for ODA – development of “tiger team” to directly address how to define future policy objectives and harmonize positions between other detainee and perceptions of rights to traditional EPW’s.

OPR: USD(P)

OCR: USD(P)

**(U) FIX/ACTION/CHANGE:**

**Fix: Develop DoD Policy or NSPD.**

**Action: Form team to examine specific policy issues regarding GC and detention operations. Draft DoD Policy, DoDD, and NSPD (along with inter-agency) to address specific issues.**

**Change: Development of “grand strategy” for detention that is GC compliant and addresses national security objectives.**



# S-003 Filling Personnel Requirements

## (U) RECOMMENDATION/OBSERVATION

- Need more professional linguists, interrogators, human intelligence, counter-intelligence, corrections police and behavioral scientists

## (U) CURRENT ASSESSMENT:



- Met with representatives of P&R to discuss recommendations (January 05).
- They are developing strategy and will report back to ODA before next SLOC meeting.
- ODA assisting ASD(HA) in development of hiring program/track for Behavioral scientists.

OPR: USD (P&R)

OCR: USD(P)

## (U) FIX/ACTION/CHANGE:

**Fix:** Develop action plan to recruit more linguists, intelligence analysts, and other personnel to support detention operations.

**Action:** Develop action plan for recruiting and retaining people with necessary skill.

**Change:** GWOT mission will be better staffed and provide for efficacy in intel and interrogation missions.



# S-001 Policy Alignment w/ Geneva

(U) RECOMMENDATION/OBSERVATION

- Need to further define policy for DoD and other government agencies to align with Geneva Conventions

(U//~~FOUO~~) CURRENT ASSESSMENT:



- Defining policy is “easy” – question is resolving our own internal conflicts over intelligence missions and international perceptions of our legal obligations.
- Priority for ODA – development of “tiger team” to directly address how to define future policy objectives and harmonize positions between other detainee and perceptions of rights to traditional EPW’s.

OPR: USD(P)

OCR: USD(P)

(U) FIX/ACTION/CHANGE:

Fix: Develop DoD Policy or NSPD.

Action: Form team to examine specific policy issues regarding GC and detention operations. Draft DoD Policy, DoDD, and NSPD (along with inter-agency) to address specific issues.

Change: Development of “grand strategy” for detention that is GC compliant and addresses national security objectives.



# S-006 Interrogation Policy

**(U) RECOMMENDATION/OBSERVATION**

- Well-documented policy and procedures on approved interrogation techniques

**(U) CURRENT ASSESSMENT:**

- • USD(I) has designated their Policy and Strategy office to develop DoD Interrogation Policy

OPR: USD (I)

OCR: USD(P)

**(U) FIX/ACTION/CHANGE:**

**Fix: Issue DOD Interrogation Policy**

**Action: USD(I) designated their Policy and Strategy office to develop and coordinate DoD Interrogation Policy**

**Change: USD(I) policy will serve as policy guidance for interrogation – recommendation satisfied in developing “well documented” policy.**





# S-008 DOD/OGA Guidelines

## (U) RECOMMENDATION/OBSERVATION

- Clearer guidelines for the interaction of OGA's with the Department of Defense in detention and interrogation operations must be defined

## (U) CURRENT ASSESSMENT:

- • USD(I) is reviewing in development of the DoD policy.
- Promulgation of interrogation policy under development. Policy will address relationships of OGA's and DOD directorates and agents.

OPR: USD (I)  
OCR: USD(P)

**(U) FIX/ACTION/CHANGE:**

**Fix: Issue DOD Interrogation Policy**

**Action: USD(I) will promulgate policy that defines relationships between OGA's and DOD agents.**

**Change: Ambiguity resolved.**



## S-012 Impartial Rapid Reporting to the Sec Def

**(U) RECOMMENDATION/OBSERVATION**

- The Secretary of Defense should ensure the effective functioning of rapid reporting channels for communicating bad news to senior Department of Defense leadership

**(U) CURRENT ASSESSMENT:**

- Proposal to fast-track information to the Secretary was approved 13 Dec 04.

OPR: USD (P&R)


OCR: USD (P)

**(x) FIX/ACTION/CHANGE:**

**Fix:** Joint adaptation of procedures such as the Air Force special notification process.

**Action:** Office to fast-track has been “stood up” – headed by Richard McGraw; still working space and employment/resource issues, but, office is functioning.

**Change:** No change from last meeting



# S-014 Additional Training of Medical Personnel

## (U) RECOMMENDATION/OBSERVATION

- Need training for medical personnel on reporting abuse. Medical personnel need to be trained with better field treatment techniques

## (U) CURRENT ASSESSMENT:

- Medical ethics policy in final stages of promulgation. Directly addresses reporting violations.
- Currently discussing with ASD(HA) development tracks regarding treatment and non-treatment medical ops. (ODA/USD(I)/OGC/HA)

OPR: USD (HA)

OCR: USD (P)

### (x) FIX/ACTION/CHANGE:

**Fix:** Provide structured training to Medical Personnel on Detainees matters

**Action:** USD(P) working with ASD(HA) in development of medical training policy.

**Change:** Detainees are given excellent medical care and doctors have clear methods for carrying out their obligations.



# GS-001 Law of War Treaties

(U) RECOMMENDATION/OBSERVATION

- Harmonizing policies and treaties with allies

(U) CURRENT ASSESSMENT:

- ODA's assessment is that no policy is in conflict with our international or treaty obligations. All policies that have been issued since the beginning of GWOT were thoroughly examined by the DoDGC before issuance.
- International perceptions and analysis of the choices made at the SECDEF and POTUS level have created disagreements where the law is silent or has contradictory guidance.
- The nature of GWOT has produced unique situations that need *better* guidance based upon what we have learned – lessons that can be applied to creating better policy as well as better international relations with our allies.

OPR: USD (P)  
OCR: USD (P)

(U) FIX/ACTION/CHANGE:

**Fix:** Review all current policies and regulations w/ regard to allies

**Action:** ODA is currently revising all DoDD and policies and will assist ARMY in the revisions of AR 190-8 and other documents as requested.

**Change:** Revision of Detainee Operations Policy as well as issuance of larger "covering" policies will demonstrate how DoD operations satisfy international treaty obligations.



# GS-002 Partial Immunity Program

**(U) RECOMMENDATION/OBSERVATION**

- Develop limited program designed to encourage disclosure of any remaining abuses

**(U) CURRENT ASSESSMENT:**

- Mechanisms currently exist to report/disclose abuses.
- Greater command emphasis needed in how to use existing reporting channels
- OSD is working with P&R (Health Affairs) to address training requirements for reporting abuse.
- OGC has addressed this in its revision of the DoDD on "law of war".
- ODA will be reporting to Congress 2X a year on violations reported to the SECDEF.


OPR: USD (P)/DoD OGC  
 OCR: USD (P)

**(U) FIX/ACTION/CHANGE:**

**Fix:** Develop and implement appropriate training and update related DoDD and Regs

**Action:** ODA will be assisting on the revision of AR 190-8 w/ Army. OGC is revising 5100.77 to reflect changes in US law and requirements on reporting. Other OSD components are issuing their own reporting policies (e.g. ASD(HA) medical ethics policy.)

**Change:** Mechanisms will be enhanced to report violations.



# GS-004 Review of Manual for Courts-Martial and UCMJ

**(U) RECOMMENDATION/OBSERVATION**

- Review for adequacy with respect to detainee abuse (similar to post-Aberdeen)

**(U) CURRENT ASSESSMENT:**

- Do not believe task is properly assigned to OSD/USD(P) request reassignment as USD(P) has no authority over UCMJ or to evaluate adequately

OPR: Do not believe USD(P) has authority.

OCR: Do not believe USD(P) has oversight.

**(U) FIX/ACTION/CHANGE:**

Fix:

Action:

Change:



# GS-005 Review of JCS activity under Goldwater-Nichols

**(U) RECOMMENDATION/OBSERVATION**

- Review for adequacy with respect to detainee abuse (similar to post-Aberdeen)

**(U) CURRENT ASSESSMENT:**

- Do not believe task is properly assigned to OSD/USD(P) request reassignment as USD(P) has no authority

**OPR: Do not believe USD(P) has authority.**

**OCR: Do not believe USD(P) has oversight.**

**(U) FIX/ACTION/CHANGE:**

**Fix:**

**Action:**

**Change:**



# GS-009 Sufficiency of Ongoing Investigations

**(U) RECOMMENDATION/OBSERVATION**

- Is the scope of ongoing investigations sufficient to address issues to satisfy all interests

**(U) CURRENT ASSESSMENT:**

- Church was charged with this mandate – to make a formal determination.
- OSD is supporting all DoD investigations
- 13 investigations – 8 major, 5 operational.
- New investigation opened – SOUTHCOM response to FOIA FBI allegations.

OPR: USD (P)

OCR: USD (P)

**(U) FIX/ACTION/CHANGE:**

Fix:

Action:

Change:





# GS-011 Congress Questions on "Ghost Detainees"

**(U) RECOMMENDATION/OBSERVATION**

- Congress question: "What is a *Ghost Detainee* and how many have there been?"

**(U) CURRENT ASSESSMENT:**




- ODA has addressed this issue with the SECDEF as well as USD(I) and OGA's.
- The SECDEF has briefed this issue publicly regarding the *one* detainee who was held without prompt registration with the ICRC.
- It is DoD policy to promptly register all detainees.
- ODA & USD(P) officials have briefed Congress on this issue – we are preparing for upcoming hearings on issue.
- To the extent required, ODA will work with OGC and USD(I) to resolve any remaining issues on this sensitive matter.

OPR: USD (P)  
OCR: USD (P)

**(U) FIX/ACTION/CHANGE:**  
**Fix:** Adequately brief Congress regarding "Ghost Detainee" issue.

**Action:** Classified briefings with Congress.

**Change:** Congress question answered.



# GS-013 Role of Medical Personnel in Abuse

## (U) RECOMMENDATION/OBSERVATION

- To what extent, if any, did medical personnel participate in or fail to report alleged abuse

## (U) CURRENT ASSESSMENT:

- Action is under review.
- USD(P) has been working closely with USD(P&R) (Health Affairs) in examining the legal, ethical, and practical elements of Medical personnel interaction w/ detainees.
- Worked with HA to draft medical ethics policy – awaiting SECDEF approval for ASD(HA) to issue.
- Tiger team of USD(I) USD(P) and ASD(HA) reviewing the use of behavioral sciences in lawful interrogations.

## (x) FIX/ACTION/CHANGE:

**Fix:** Issue Policy Guidance on role of medical personnel in Detainee Operations

**Action:** Develop DoD Policy Guidance

**Change:** Defined role of medical personnel

OPR: USD (P)  
OCR: USD (P)



# GS-015 Interagency Coordination and Harmonization

## (U) RECOMMENDATION/OBSERVATION

- Task force to review streamlining interagency process to support GWOT

## (U) CURRENT ASSESSMENT:

- USD (P) does not see an actionable recommendation
- USGs Detainee Policy is an governed through the interagency process (PCC, DC, and PC)
- ODA routinely engages DOS, DOJ, NSC, and DHS on issues on GWOT and detention. Not sure that "the system is broken" when analyzing Church's recommendation.

## (U) FIX/ACTION/CHANGE:

Fix:

Action:

Change:

OPR: USD (P)  
OCR: USD (P)



# GS-016 Develop Policy for Joint Interagency Detainee Ops

**(U) RECOMMENDATION/OBSERVATION**

- Common guidance is required where multiple agencies (e.g. DoD, FBI, CIA) perform joint/combined interrogations, common guidance is required.

**(U) CURRENT ASSESSMENT:**

- • USDI is addressing Joint Interagency roles in the DoD Interrogation process

OPR: USD (I)

OCR: USD (P)

**(U) FIX/ACTION/CHANGE:**

**Fix: Issue common guidance.**

**Action: Interagency coordination of interrogation policy.**

**Change: Common practices for all engaged in intelligence gathering.**



# F-019 Contracting Shortfalls to Training

## (U) RECOMMENDATION/OBSERVATION

- The contracting system failed to ensure that properly trained and vetted linguist and interrogator personnel were hired to support operations at Abu Ghraib.

## (U) CURRENT ASSESSMENT:

- Issue will be addressed by the Joint Task Force Policy Charter between OSD and ARMY
- Issue has been discussed with P&R to develop a plan for training and vetting linguists in contract work.

OPR: Joint Policy Task Force

OCR: USD (P)

## (U) FIX/ACTION/CHANGE:

**Fix:** DoD should establish policy on the use of contract interrogators for all services

**Action:** Working w/ ASAALT to establish clear standards in SOW

**Change:** Policy/Training



# F-023 DoD Enforcement of Procedures Conducted by OGA

**(U) RECOMMENDATION/OBSERVATION**

- DoD must enforce adherence by OGA with established DoD practices and procedures while conducting detainee interrogation operations at DoD facilities

**(U) CURRENT ASSESSMENT:**

- USD(I) responsible for inter-agency coordination on intelligence issues. They have been developing policy to address the concerns of DoD when OGA's are engaged in law/intelligence activities.

OPR: USD (I)  
OCR: USD (P)

**(x) FIX/ACTION/CHANGE:**

**Fix:** DoD Policy Emphasis

**Action:** Issue Policy guidance and update existing MOUs

**Change:** Clearly defined OGA role in interrogation of DoD detainees



# R-055 Align the Release Process of Security Internees w/ DoD Policy

**(U) RECOMMENDATION/OBSERVATION**

- The release process for security internees is not consistent with DoD Policy.

**(U) CURRENT ASSESSMENT:**

- USD (P) will coordinate with OSD, Army and other service components to harmonize policies and issue new guidance viz. 2320.1 and AR 190-8

OPR: USD (P)

OCR: USD (P)

**(U) FIX/ACTION/CHANGE:**

**Fix:** Policy alignment required

**Action:** Align policy

**Change:** Issue new DoDD directives and rewrite 190-8 to reflect changes



# T-011 Standardized Accountability Practices in Detention Facilities

**(U) RECOMMENDATION/OBSERVATION**

- Accountability practices throughout any particular detention facility must be standardized and in accordance with applicable regulations and international law.

**(U) CURRENT ASSESSMENT:**

- USD (P) does not think this is an OSD matter and requests reassignment to JCS or Army. Accounting for detainees is prescribed under AR190-8 (PWIC) with ARMY as executive agent.

OPR: USD (P)


OCR: USD (P)

**(x) FIX/ACTION/CHANGE:**

Fix:

Action:

Change:





# F-008 Adopt One DoD Policy on Interrogation

**(U) RECOMMENDATION/OBSERVATION**

- Adopt one DoD policy for interrogation, within the framework of existing doctrine, adhering to the standards found in doctrine, and enforce that standard policy across DoD.

**(U) CURRENT ASSESSMENT:**

- USD(P) is working with USD(I) to complete develop and publish DoD policy on interrogation

OPR: USD (I)  
OCR: USD (P)

**(U) FIX/ACTION/CHANGE:**

**Fix: USD (I) develop interrogation policy**

**Action: USD(I) has lead on policy development**

**Change: Harmonized policy.**



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FM CJCS WASHINGTON DC  
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RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC  
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC  
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL  
RUCBACM/USCINCJFCOM NORFOLK VA  
RHMFISS/USCINCJFCOM NORFOLK VA  
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL  
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL  
RHMFISS/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL  
INFO RHEHWSR/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
RUFGCIN/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE  
RHMFISS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE  
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI  
RUCQSOC/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL  
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RUPEUNA/USCINCSpace PETERSON AFB CO  
RUFGCIN/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECCS//  
RHMFISS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECCS//  
RUCBACM/USCINCJFCOM NORFOLK VA//J3/J33/J34/J2M//  
RHMFISS/USCINCJFCOM NORFOLK VA//J3/J33/J34/J2M//  
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3/J33/J34/J7//  
RUCQSOC/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL//SODC//  
RHMFISS/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL//SODC//  
RUPEUNA/USCINCSpace PETERSON AFB CO//J3//  
RUCUSTR/USCINSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE//CC/CS//  
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC/G-O/G-OP/G-OPD/G-OPF/G-  
W//  
RHCUAAA/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//TCJ3-J4/TCJ3-OD/TCMD//  
RHMFISS/USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//TCJ3-J4/TCJ3-OD/TCMD//  
RUFDAAA/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//J3//  
RUEOEGA/COMUSARCENT (FWD) DOHA KU  
RHRMDAB/COMUSNAVCENT//N3//  
RUCJICL/COMUSMARCENT HQ MACDILL AFB FL//G3//COS/G5//  
RUCKMAA/COMMARFORLANT NORFOLK VA  
RUCBCLF/CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA  
RUEOBBA/COMUSCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//A3/A5//  
RHCUAAA/HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC/CV/DO/LG//  
RHCUAAA/HQ AMC TACC SCOTT AFB IL//CC/CV/XOO/XOP//  
RHMFISS/HQ AMC TACC SCOTT AFB IL//CC/CV/XOO/XOP//  
RHCUMAC/HQ AMC TACC COMMAND CENTER SCOTT AFB  
IL//XOO/XOX/XOS//  
RUEASRT/COMUSARCENT-CDRUSATHIRD FT MCPHERSON GA//AFRD-DT//

RUCJICS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//SOJ3//  
RUEASRB/FORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA/G3//  
RUEOEGA/CJTF KUWAIT  
RUEOEEC/CJTF SWA//J3/CC//  
RUEOEEC/CJTF SWA//CFACC//  
RUETIAA/DIRSNA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD  
RUEJDCA/DISA WASHINGTON DC  
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC  
RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC  
RUCOBRR/LANTNAVFACENCOM NORFOLK VA  
RHMFISS/LANTNAVFACENCOM NORFOLK VA  
RUEADLA/DLA FT BELVOIR VA//D/J-3/J-341//  
RHMFISS/DLA FT BELVOIR VA//D/J-3/J-341//  
RHMFISS/DSCP PHILADELPHIA PA  
RHMFISS/DSCP PHILADELPHIA PA  
RUEADLA/DLSC FT BELVOIR VA  
RUEADLA/DCMA FT BELVOIR VA  
RHMFISS/DCMA FT BELVOIR VA  
RUEMANA/DDC NEW CUMBERLAND PA  
RUEAAMC/CDRAMC ALEXANDRIA VA  
RHMFISS/CDRAMC ALEXANDRIA VA  
RUCOWCZ/COMLANTAREA COGARD PORTSMOUTH VA  
RHMFISS/COMLANTAREA COGARD PORTSMOUTH VA  
RUCKMEA/CG II MEF  
RHMFISS/CG II MEF  
RUCOGCA/COMNAVBASE GUANTANAMO BAY CU

~~SECRET~~

OPER/ENDURING FREEDOM//  
MSGID/ORDER/CJCS//  
REF/A/WARNORD/CJCS/220040ZDEC01/-/NOTAL//  
REF/B/MSG/USCINCSO/272050ZDEC01//  
AMPN//~~(S)~~ REF A IS CJCS WARNING ORDER DIRECTING USCINCSO TO  
PROVIDE COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE FOR PREPARATION TO USE NAVAL  
BASE, GUANTANAMO BAY (GTMO), CUBA, AS AN EXTENDED DETAINEE  
HOLDING FACILITY. REF B IS USCINCSO COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE.  
ORDTYP/EXORD/CJCS//  
TIMEZONE/Z//  
NARR//~~(S)~~ THIS IS AN EXECUTE ORDER. THE SECDEF HAS APPROVED  
USCINCSO'S CONCEPT IN COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE FOR NAVAL BASE,  
GUANTANAMO BAY (GTMO), CUBA, DETAINEE OPERATIONS (REF B) WITH  
MODIFICATIONS AND DIRECTS USCINCSO TO PREPARE FOR OPERATION OF

(b)(1)



GENTEXT/SITUATION/


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
A. (U) TASKINGS  
(1) (U) USCINCSO



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


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(5) (U) USCINCPACOM


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(7) (U) CNO. PROVIDE INSTALLATION SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.

(8) (U) CNO, CSA, CMC, CSAF. BPT PROVIDE PERSONNEL TO AUGMENT AND ENABLE FORMATION OF JTF-160. DIRECT COORDINATION WITH USCINCSO IS AUTHORIZED TO DEFINE SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR GRADE, SPECIALTY, AND NUMBERS.

(b)(1)

(10) (U) DOS. REQUEST ASSISTANCE FOR OPERATING COMMANDS IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR NECESSARY DIPLOMATIC, OVERFLIGHT, AND OPERATING RIGHTS LAW FOREIGN CLEARANCE GUIDE AND OTHER APPROPRIATE DIRECTIVES.

(b)(1)

5. (U) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

A. (U) C-DAY, L-HOUR. UPON RECEIPT OF THIS ORDER

(b)(1)

D. (U) THIS OPERATION IS DESIGNATED OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM.

(b)(1)

F. (U) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) AND RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE (RUF). CJCS STANDING ROE (CJCSI 3121.01A, DATED 15 JAN 00) AND DOD RUF (DODD 5210.56, DATED 1 NOV 01) ARE IN EFFECT. SUBMIT REQUESTS FOR SUPPLEMENTAL ROE AND/OR RUF AS REQUIRED. SUBMIT REQUEST FOR SUPPLEMENTAL ROE FOR MARITIME AND AIR DEFENSE FORCES NLT SUBMISSION OF REQUEST FOR DEPLOYMENT OF THOSE FORCES.

G. (U) DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP JOINT STAFF INFORMED.

H. (U) IN-TRANSIT VISIBILITY (ITV). TO ENSURE THE ITV OF DEPLOYING AND REDEPLOYING PERSONNEL, CARGO, AND EQUIPMENT, DOD

COMPONENTS, AGENCIES, AND SERVICES WILL CAPTURE, PROCESS, AND TRANSMIT SHIPMENT INFORMATION FOR CARGO EQUIPMENT IN ELECTRONIC FORMAT TO MAXIMIZE ELECTRONIC CAPTURE OF MOVEMENT DATA VIA AUTOMATED INFORMATION SYSTEMS FEEDING THE GLOBAL TRANSPORTATION NETWORK (GTN). THE GTN INTERNET ADDRESS IS WWW.GTN.TRANSCOM.MIL. COMMANDS WITHOUT ACCESS TO GTN WILL REPORT PLANNED MISSION TO THEIR NEXT HIGHER HEADQUARTERS FOR GTN ENTRY. IF UNITS DO NOT HAVE THE MEANS TO SUPPORT AUTOMATED MANIFEST FEEDS TO GTN, UNITS MUST REQUEST SUPPORT THROUGH SERVICE CHANNELS OR THE USTRANSCOM CAT. SHIPPER/UNITS MUST COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF DOD REGULATION 4500.32R, MILITARY STANDARD TRANSPORTATION AND MOVEMENT PROCEDURES (MILSTAMP). THE ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF UNIT PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT AT ALL NODES FROM ORIGIN TO DESTINATION WILL BE VISIBLE IN GTN WITHIN ONE HOUR OF THE MOVEMENT EVENT.

I. (U) ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION

(1) (U) USCINCSO HAS ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION RESPONSIBILITY (AT/FP) FOR FORCES WITHIN USSOUTHCOM AOR. SUPPORTING CINCS AND/OR SERVICES ENSURE ALL FORCES DEPLOYED ARE AWARE OF THE THREAT LEVELS AND FORCE PROTECTION CONDITIONS SET BY USCINCSO THROUGHOUT THE USSOUTHCOM AOR. SUPPORTING CINCS AND/OR SERVICES ENSURE ALL FORCES COMPLETE USCINCSO-REQUIRED PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING, TO INCLUDE TERRORISM AWARENESS TRAINING IAW USCINCSO REG 380-16 AT/FP PROGRAM. USCINCSO AT/FP INFORMATION CAN BE FOUND AT THE USSOUTHCOM SIPRNET WEB SITE [HTTP://SCSENTSQL1.HQ.SOUTHCOM.SMIL.MIL/SCJ3/SCJ33/SCJ337](http://SCSENTSQL1.HQ.SOUTHCOM.SMIL.MIL/SCJ3/SCJ33/SCJ337) (ALL LOWER CASE), OR BY CALLING DSN 567-1259, AT/FP CURRENT OPS AND TRAINING. USCINCSO WILL ENSURE DEPLOYED FORCES RECEIVE APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF ANTITERRORISM AWARENESS AND APPLICABLE ROE TRAINING UPON ARRIVAL AND, AS REQUIRED, THROUGHOUT THE LENGTH OF DEPLOYMENT IN THE USSOUTHCOM AOR.

(2) (U) USCINCCENT HAS AT/FP RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY USCINCSO ASSIGNED FORCES WHEN DEPLOYED WITHIN USCENTCOM AOR AS PART OF A FORWARD SECURITY ELEMENT TO ESCORT DETAINEES TO GTMO. USCINCSO WILL ENSURE ALL FORCES DEPLOYED ARE AWARE OF THE THREAT LEVELS AND FORCE PROTECTION CONDITIONS SET BY USCINCCENT THROUGHOUT THE USCENTCOM AOR. USCINCSO WILL ENSURE ALL FORCES COMPLETE USCINCCENT-REQUIRED PREDEPLOYMENT TRAINING, TO INCLUDE TERRORISM AWARENESS TRAINING IAW USCINCCENT OPORD 97-01A, FORCE PROTECTION OPORD. USCINCCENT WILL ENSURE DEPLOYED FORCES RECEIVE APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF ANTITERRORISM AWARENESS AND APPLICABLE ROE TRAINING UPON ARRIVAL AND, AS REQUIRED, THROUGHOUT THE LENGTH OF DEPLOYMENT IN THE USCINCCENT AOR.

(3) (U) ENSURE FORCE PROTECTION MEASURES INCLUDE PROVISIONS FOR CONTRACTORS INVOLVED IN THE OPERATION, CONSISTENT WITH GOVERNING CONTRACTS.//

J. (U) STATUS OF FORCES. USCINCSO/USCINCCENT WILL ENSURE PERSONNEL DEPLOYING TO THE USSOUTHCOM/USCENTCOM AOR



RECEIVE IN-COUNTRY LEGAL BRIEFING CONCERNING LEGAL STATUS OF US PERSONNEL DEPLOYED TO THE USSOUTHCOM/USCENTCOM AOR.

K. (U) CONCURRENT UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE AUTHORITY, INCLUDING ARTICLE 15 AUTHORITY, TRANSFERS TO USCINCSO WITH OPCON. USCINCSO ADMINISTERS MILITARY JUSTICE AUTHORITY THROUGH SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS AS REQUIRED.//  
GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

6. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

A. (U) AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY IS 1B1.

B. (U) FUNDING. THE JOINT STAFF WILL NOT PROVIDE FUNDING. CINC COMPONENT COMMANDS WILL FUND ALL COSTS OF THIS OPERATION, TO INCLUDE PREDEPLOYMENT, DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT COSTS. CINC COMPONENT COMMANDS WILL CAPTURE AND REPORT INCREMENTAL COSTS TO SERVICE COMPTROLLERS. SERVICE COMPTROLLERS WILL REPORT INCREMENTAL COSTS TO DFAS-DENVER IAW DOD FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT REGULATION 7000.14R, VOLUME 12, CHAPTER 23, PARA 2308.

C. (U) USE CJCS PROJECT CODE 9GF.

D. (U) USE OF JOPES IS DIRECTED. SUPPORTED CINCS SHOULD CREATE GLOBAL COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM (GCCS) NEWSGROUPS FOR TIME PHASED FORCE DEPLOYMENT DATA (TPFDD) PLANNING AND COORDINATION. USTRANSCOM WILL EVALUATE TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PUBLISHED CJCS PRIORITY GUIDANCE. JOINT PUB 4-01 IDENTIFIES USTRANSCOM AS THE INITIAL ARBITER (AS GUIDED BY THE CJCS PRIORITIES) FOR DECONFLICTING REQUIREMENTS BETWEEN CINCS. IN THE RARE EVENT THAT USTRANSCOM AND THE AFFECTED CINCS ARE UNABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT, THE JOINT TRANSPORTATION BOARD WILL ADJUDICATE.

E. ALL MESSAGE TRAFFIC CONCERNING THESE OPERATIONS SHOULD BE TRANSMITTED WITHIN THE SOUTHCOM.JOPES.OPERATIONS.NEWSGROUPS. ALL REQUIREMENTS WILL BE ENTERED WITHIN PIDS 6115D FOR DEPLOYMENT AND 6115R FOR REDEPLOYMENT.

F. (U) REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. REPORT INTENDED MOVEMENTS IN DAILY SITREP IN ACCORDANCE WITH CJCSM 3150.05 (OPREP 2). PROVIDE AETER-ACTION REPORTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH CJCSI 3150.25

(b)(1)

H. (U) KNOWN LOGISTICS CONSTRAINTS. USCINCSO WILL IDENTIFY CONSTRAINTS TO JOINT STAFF.

(b)(1)

J. (U) COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE. USCINCSO WILL PUBLISH COMSEC GUIDANCE TO ALCON. WHERE RESOURCES ARE NOT SATISFIED BY

AUGMENTING OR SUPPORTING UNITS, VALIDATE AND FORWARD  
REQUIREMENTS FOR CJCS-CONTROLLED ASSETS, AND ANY ADDITIONAL  
SATELLITE CAPACITY BEYOND CURRENT APPORTIONMENT, TO THE JOINT  
STAFF.//

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/

(b)(1)

AGENCIES, AS REQUIRED.//


8. (U) JOINT STAFF POC IS (b)(6)

(b)(6)

AKNLDG/YES//

DECL/CLBY: LTGEN G.S. NEWBOLD, DJ-3; RES: 1.5 (A); DECLON: 3 JAN  
2012//

~~SECRET~~



# *VCJCS Detainee Update*

~~SECRET~~

Derived from Multiple Sources  
Declassify on: 15 DEC 2015

JS GHOST DOCS 1022

## *Agenda*

- **Purpose: to provide VCJCS an update on key Detainee Issues:**
  - **Detainee Locations/Numbers Update**
  - **Military Commissions**
  - **Internment Serial Number Policy**
  - **Guantanamo (GTMO) Way Ahead**
  - **Public Diplomacy**
  - **Transfer from GTMO**
  - **Iraq Detention Operations Transition**
  - **Afghan Detainee Transfer**
  - **Detainee Senior Leadership Oversight Council (DSLOC) Recommendations Status by Organization**



## *Detainee Update*

As of: 3 AUG 1130 hrs

(b)(1)

## *Military Commissions*

**Military Commissions (MCs) are used to prosecute enemy combatants who violate the laws of war**

- **Issues**

- Commissions apply to non-US citizens subject to POTUS' 13NOV 01 military order. POTUS must find "reason to believe" individual was a member of al Qaida, committed acts of international terrorism against the US, or harbored such an individual
- POTUS has, so far, determined 15 detainees at Guantanamo (GTMO) are subject to commissions; 3 detainees have since been returned to their home country (2 to UK, 1 to Australia)
- Commissions provide a full and fair trial, while protecting national security and safety of all involved, including accused
- Commissions and their procedures are the subject of several federal court lawsuits brought by detainees

- **Way Ahead:** GTMO MCs currently suspended pending ongoing litigation. Federal appeals court declared them constitutional, but an appeal to the US Supreme Court is likely. Plan is to resume Commissions as soon as legally feasible

## *Internment Serial Number Policy*

**Internment Serial Numbers (ISNs) are issued to detainees as soon as possible, normally within 14 days of capture**

- **Issues**

- Assignment of ISN triggers detention notification to International Committee of Red Cross, with appropriate follow-on access

(b)(1) (b)(5)





## *Guantanamo Way Ahead*

**Foreign and domestic critics have called for closure of GTMO and relocation or release of detainees**

- **Issues**

- GTMO is specifically designed to support the detention and interrogation missions at the strategic level
- Over the past year the mission has evolved more into one emphasizing detention, with interrogations focused on a subset group of detainees

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6

## *Public Diplomacy*

**Public Diplomacy (PD) efforts on detention operations are being spearheaded by Department of State (DOS); Department of Defense to support**

- **Issues**

- DOS's PD efforts will provide information on topics such as results of abuse investigations, US Government (USG) position on mistreatment, legal basis for detention, value of intelligence derived from detainees, etc.


(b)(1)



## *Transfers from GTMO*

**Strong DOS efforts are necessary to transfer detainees out of GTMO**

- **Issues**





## *Iraq Detention Operations Transition*

**Efforts are underway to transition Iraq detention operations from MNF-I to Iraqi control**

- **Issues**

(b)(1)



## *Afghan Detainee Transfers*

**Efforts are underway to transfer detainees to Afghan government control**




(b)(1)





# *Detainee Senior Leadership Oversight Council (DSLOC) Recommendations Status by Report*

Source Report	Recommendations	Closed Items	Open Items (Amber)	Open Items (Blue)
RYDER	160	117	5	38
MILLER	21	17	3	1
TAGUBA	35	32	3	0
DAIG	52	34	14	4
FAY	28	15	11	2
JONES	19	9	6	4
SCHLESINGER	14	2	8	4
JACOBY	32	24	5	3
FORMICA	8	6	0	2
CHURCH G&S	17	9	3	5
CHURCH DO&DIT	44	18	24	2
CHURCH GTMO/CHAR	12	9	2	1
SCHMIDT & FURLOW	27	15	12	0
KILEY	23	0	23	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>492</b>	<b>307</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>66</b>

 <b>GREEN:</b> Recommendation Closed
 <b>AMBER:</b> Approved Action Plan
 <b>BLUE:</b> Intent of initial recommendation met

As of: 05Aug.05



# *MILITARY COMMISSIONS*

**Military Commissions are used to prosecute enemy combatants who violate the laws of war**

- **Issues**

- Commissions apply to non-US citizens subject to POTUS' 13NOV 01 military order. POTUS must find "reason to believe" individual was a member of al Qaida, committed acts of international terrorism against the US, or harbored such an individual
- POTUS has, so far, determined 15 detainees at GTMO are subject to commissions; 3 detainees have since been returned to their home country (2 to UK, 1 to Australia)
- Commissions provide a full and fair trial, while protecting national security and safety of all involved, including accused
- Commissions and their procedures are the subject of several federal court lawsuits brought by detainees

- **Way Ahead:** GTMO MCs currently suspended pending ongoing litigation. Federal appeals court declared them constitutional, but an appeal to the US Supreme Court is likely. Plan is to resume Commissions as soon as legally feasible




# *INTERNMENT SERIAL NUMBER POLICY*

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- **Issues**

- Assignment of ISN triggers detention notification to International Committee of Red Cross, with appropriate follow-on access

(b)(1); (b)(5)





# *GUANTANAMO (GTMO) WAY AHEAD*

**Foreign and domestic critics have called for closure of GTMO and relocation or release of detainees**


- **Issues**

- GTMO is specifically designed to support the detention and interrogation missions at the strategic level
- Over the past year the mission has evolved more into one emphasizing detention, with interrogations focused on a subset group of detainees

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# *PUBLIC DIPLOMACY*


**Public Diplomacy (PD) efforts on detention operations are being spearheaded by Department of State (DOS); Department of Defense (DOD) to support**

- **Issues**

- DOS's PD efforts will provide information on topics such as results of abuse investigations, US Government (USG) position on mistreatment, legal basis for detention, value of intelligence derived from detainees, etc.

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


# *TRANSFERS FROM GTMO*


**Strong DOS efforts are necessary to transfer detainees out of GTMO**

- **Issues**

(b)(1), (b)(5)









# *IRAQ DETAINEE OPERATIONS TRANSITION*

**Efforts are underway to transition Iraq detention operations from MNF-I to Iraqi control**

- **Issues**






# *AFGHAN DETAINEE TRANSFERS*


**Efforts are underway to transfer detainees to Afghan government control**

- **Issues**

(b)(1), (b)(5)









# DSLOC Recommendations Status by Organization

Organization	Recommendations	Closed Items	Open Items (Amber)	Open Items (Blue)
CENTCOM	175	162	10	3
OSD	126	34	44	48
Army	106	64	37	5
SOUTHCOM	30	21	8	0
Policy Working Group	20	9	4	7
Joint Staff	16	6	8	2
JFCOM	10	5	5	0
Navy	4	3	0	1
Army/Navy	2	2	0	0
CENTCOM/ SOUTHCOM	1	0	1	0
Army/CENTCOM	1	0	1	0
UCMJ Working Group	1	1	0	0



- GREEN**: Recommendation Closed
- AMBER**: Approved Action Plan
- BLUE**: Intent of initial recommendation met

As of 05 Aug 05



# *MILITARY COMMISSIONS*

**Military Commissions are used to prosecute enemy combatants who violate the laws of war**

- **Issues**

- Commissions apply to non-U.S. citizens subject to POTUS's 13 Nov 01 military order. POTUS must find "reason to believe" individual was a member of Al Qaeda, committed acts of international terrorism against the U.S., or harbored such an individual
- POTUS has, so far, determined 15 detainees at GTMO are subject to commissions; 3 detainees have since been returned to their home country (2 to UK, 1 to Australia); charges have been referred to trial in 4 cases
- Commissions provide a full and fair trial, while protecting national security and safety of all involved, including accused
- Commissions and their procedures are the subject of several federal court lawsuits brought by detainees

- **Way Ahead:** Military Commissions at GTMO are currently suspended pending ongoing litigation. A federal appeals court declared them constitutional, but an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court is likely. Plan is to resume Commissions as soon as legally feasible




# *INTERNMENT SERIAL NUMBER POLICY*

**Internment Serial Numbers (ISNs) are issued to detainees as soon as possible, normally within 14 days of capture**

- **Issues**

- Assignment of ISN triggers detention notification to International Committee of Red Cross, with appropriate follow-on access

(b)(1)





# *GUANTANAMO (GTMO) WAY AHEAD*

**Foreign and domestic critics have called for closure of GTMO and relocation or release of detainees**

- **Issues**

- GTMO is specifically designed to support the detention and interrogation missions at the strategic level
- Over the past year the mission has evolved more into one emphasizing detention, with interrogations focused on a subset group of detainees

– (b)(5)

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# *PUBLIC DIPLOMACY*

**Public Diplomacy (PD) efforts on detention operations are being spearheaded by Department of State (DOS); Department of Defense (DOD) to support**

- **Issues**

- DOS's PD efforts will provide information on topics such as results of abuse investigations, US Government (USG) position on mistreatment, legal basis for detention, value of intelligence derived from detainees, etc.

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


# *TRANSFERS FROM GTMO*

**Strong DOS efforts are necessary to transfer detainees out of GTMO**

- **Issues**

(b)(1)






# *IRAQ DETAINEE OPERATIONS TRANSITION*

**Efforts are underway to transition Iraq detention operations from MNF-I to Iraqi control**

- **Issues**





# MILITARY COMMISSIONS

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- **Bottom Line Up Front: Military Commissions (MC's) are used to prosecute enemy combatants who violate the laws of war.**
- **Issues**
  - MC's apply to non-U.S. citizens subject to POTUS's 13 Nov 01 military order. POTUS must find "reason to believe" individual was a member of Al Qaeda, committed acts of international terrorism against the U.S., or harbored such an individual.
    - POTUS has, so far, determined 15 detainees at GTMO are subject to commissions; charges have been referred to trial in four cases.
  - Commissions provide a full and fair trial, while protecting national security and safety of all involved, including accused.
  - MCs and their procedures are the subject of several federal court lawsuits brought by detainees.
- **Way Ahead: MCs at GTMO are currently suspended pending ongoing litigation. A federal appeals court declared them constitutional, but an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court is likely. Plan is to resume MC process as soon as legally feasible.**

## *INTERNEE SERIAL NUMBER POLICY*


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- **Bottom Line Up Front: Internee Serial Numbers (ISNs) are issued to detainees as soon as possible, normally within 14 days of capture.**
- **Issues**
  - Assignment of ISN alerts International Committee of Red Cross of detention, and follow-on access.
  - COCOMs want flexibility to deviate from 14-day assignment timeline for reasons of imperative operational necessity and to maximize intelligence collection efforts; OSD concerned this will lead to loss of accountability and “ghost detainees.”
  - Proposed policy change delegates authority to CENTCOM Commander for approval to assign an ISN beyond 14 days with notification requirements to SecDef. DOD does not intend to approve any requests beyond 30 days.
- **Way Ahead: SecDef has referred the proposed change to the interagency for coordination and approval. There is some disagreement as to legal basis to go beyond 14 days.**

## *GUANATANAMO (GTMO) WAY AHEAD*

- **Bottom Line Up Front: GTMO is the best choice for continued long-term detention because of its location and the significantly reduced risk of challenge to US actions in Federal courts.**
- **Issues**
  - GTMO has the infrastructure and expansion capability to support the detention mission. Its proximity to the US facilitates logistical and other support. It can accommodate military commissions.
  - GTMO is outside US territory, so challenges to the basis for, and conditions of, detention before Federal courts are significantly reduced.
  - Under terms of the lease agreement with Cuba, the US has exclusive jurisdiction and control over the land and facilities at GTMO.
- **Way Ahead: GTMO will continue to be the site for long-term detention for the foreseeable future.**





~~SENSITIVE BUT  
UNCLASSIFIED~~

# PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

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- **Bottom Line Up Front:** Public Diplomacy (PD) efforts on detention operations are to be initiated and spearheaded by Department of State (DOS); Department of Defense (DOD) to support.
- **Issues**
  - DOS's PD efforts will provide information on topics such as results of abuse investigations, US Government (USG) position on mistreatment, legal basis for detention, value of intelligence derived from detainees, etc.
  - DOS has proposed creation of a PD Working Group to lead all PD efforts concerning detainees.
  - DOD will be proactive in addressing negative press arising in the media, Congressional inquiries, and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) releases.
- **Way Ahead**
  - DOD fully supports DOS's efforts.

## *TRANSFERS FROM GTMO*

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- **Bottom Line Up Front:** Interagency cooperation is necessary between DOS and DOD to create an integrated USG plan.
- **Issues**
  - Non-enemy combatants (NECs) depart GTMO via Detainee Movement Operations (DMO's). 49 have been conducted to date.
  - Transfer of NECs to other governments relieves USG forces (e.g., MPs) of the responsibility to guard them.
  - When detainees at GTMO are identified as transfer candidates, they are ready to go when conditions in the receiving host nation(s) are met.
- **Way Ahead**
  - Strong US commitment goes a long way to achieve receiving host nation buy-in to accept the NEC responsibility.



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

THE JOINT STAFF  
WASHINGTON, DC

Reply ZIP Code:  
20318-0300

DJSM-0523-03  
03 June 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Subject: Baghdad Interrogations

1. In response to your request for information on interrogations in Baghdad, the enclosed information paper is provided.

2. The Joint Staff point of contact is

(b)(6)

3. Without enclosure, this memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED.

JAMES A. HAWKINS  
Major General, USAF  
Vice Director, Joint Staff

Enclosure

NOT RELEASABLE TO  
FOREIGN NATIONALS

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

JS GHOST DOCS 1052

3 June 2003

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Baghdad Interrogations (U)

1. (U) Purpose. To provide information on Baghdad interrogations to DOD General Counsel.

2. (U) Key Points

(b)(1)

- 
- 
- 
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- 

Prepared by: (b)(6)

Classified By: Maj Gen Glen Shaffer, USAF, DJ-2  
Reason: 1.5(c)  
Declassify On: X1



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~  
THE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

# 176

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Peter Pace, VCJCS *VP 16 Feb 02*

SUBJECT: CIA Involvement in Detainee Interrogations (U)

- ~~(S)~~ For your information, the following is provided in response to your

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(b)(1)

- (U//~~FOUO~~) Information obtained during interrogation is published as an Intelligence Information Report (IIR) and is widely disseminated to multiple DOD, Intelligence Community and Law Enforcement consumers.

COORDINATION: None.

Prepared By: RADM L. E. Jacoby; Director, Intelligence; 697-9773

Classified By: RADM L.E. Jacoby, USN, J2  
Reason: 1.5(c)  
Declassify On: 15 February 2012

~~NOT RELEASABLE TO  
FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

THE JOINT STAFF  
WASHINGTON, DC

Reply ZIP Code:  
20318-0300

DJSM-1208-04  
20 November 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

Subject: Special Interrogation Plans ~~(S//NF)~~

1. ~~(S//NF)~~ Thank you for the opportunity to respond to your proposed process for handling special interrogation plans.<sup>1</sup> The Joint Staff concurs in the process; however, it should emphasize a goal of notifying the Secretary of Defense within seven days.

2. (U) The Joint Staff point of contact for this action is

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

NORTON A. SCHWARTZ  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Director, Joint Staff

Reference:

- 1 DASD(DA) memorandum, "Process for Handling Special Interrogation Plans ~~(S//NF)~~"<sup>2</sup>

Classified By: RADM William D. Sullivan, USN; VDJ-5  
Reason: 1.4 (a,c)  
Declassify On: 12 November 2014

~~NOT RELEASABLE TO  
FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~





**THE JOINT STAFF**  
**WASHINGTON, DC**

Reply ZIP Code:  
20318-0300

DJSM 0956-04  
03 September, 2004

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (SPECIAL  
OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT)**

**Subject: Letters From UN Special Rapporteurs Concerning Detainee Affairs (Re:  
Allegation Clarifications)**

1. Thank you for the opportunity to provide input to your response to the UN Special Rapporteur.<sup>1</sup> While the Joint Staff appreciates the Special Rapporteur's concerns, answering specific questions regarding any detainee at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO), would violate the security guidance provided by ASD (SO/LIC) memorandum I-04/000720-SO. According to this memo, discussing names and locations of detainees of enemy combatants is classified SECRET or TOP SECRET.
2. The Special Rapporteur should be assured that all detainees are being treated humanely in accordance with applicable US law, including the Convention Against Torture and other US treaty obligations. The US Government maintains a bilateral dialogue with those governments that have nationals detained at GTMO. In many, if not most cases, governments have sent representatives to GTMO to observe the condition and treatment of their nationals. In addition, the International Committee of the Red Cross visits regularly. Recommend no further comment on the specifics of those visits.
3. Recommend the following standard statement be inserted into the response: "The United States Government does not provide specific information on any individual detainee, to include name and nationality, due to operational security concerns, as well as to maintain the safety and privacy of those who have been detained as part of the global war against terrorists. We have no further comments on your specific request for information."

4. The Joint Staff point of contact is

(b)(6)

MICHAEL D. MAPLES Approved & Secured with Appl  
by: MICHAEL D. MAPLES 03 September 2004 09:1

MICHAEL D. MAPLES  
Major General, USA  
Vice Director, Joint Staff

Reference:

- | 1 ASD(SO/LIC) memorandum, I-04/010379-SO, 17 August 2004, "Letters from UN Special Rapportuers Concerning Detainee Affairs"

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P 161655Z JAN 03 FM CJCS WASHINGTON DC//DJS//  
TO RUCAACC/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL  
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RHCUAAA/CDRUSTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL  
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
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RHMFISS/CDR USJFCOM NORFOLK VA//J3/J33/J34/J2M/J5/SJA//  
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RHMFISS/COMUSSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL//SODC//  
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RHMFISS/CDRUSTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL //TCJ2/TCJ3-J4/TCJ3-OD/  
TCMD//  
RUFDAAA/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//J2/J3/J5//  
RUEOEGA/COMUSARCENT (FWD) DOHA KU  
RUCJNAV/COMUSNAVCENT//N2/N3/N5//  
RUCAICL/COMUSMARCENT HQ MACDILL AFB FL//G2/G3/COS/G5//  
RUCKMAA/COMMARFORLANT NORFOLK VA

PAGE 03 RUEKJCS8002 ~~SECRET~~  
RUCBCLF/CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA  
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RUEASRT/COMUSARCENT-CDRUSATHIRD FT MCPHERSON GA//AFRD-DT//  
RUCAICS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//SOJ2/SOJ3/SOJ5//  
RUEASRB/CDRFORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//AFOP-CAT//  
RUEASRB/FORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//G2/G3/G5//

RUDHAAA/CDRINSCOM FT BELVOIR VA  
RUEOEGA/CJTF KUWAIT  
RUEOEEC/CJTF SWA//J2/J3/J5/CC//  
RUCOGCS/CJTF GUANTANAMO BAY CU  
RUEAIAA/DIRSNA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD  
RUEJDCA/DISA WASHINGTON DC  
RHMFISS/DISA WASHINGTON DC  
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC  
RULSDMK/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION OFC OF THE SEC WASHINGTON DC//  
S1/S60/X-1//  
RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC  
RUEADLA/DLA FT BELVOIR VA//D/J-2/J-3/J-5/J-341//  
RHMFISS/DLA FT BELVOIR VA//D/J-2/J-3/J-5/J-341//

PAGE 04 RUEKJCS8002 ~~SECRET~~  
RUEOFPA/DCMA FT BELVOIR VA  
RHMFISS/DCMA FT BELVOIR VA  
RUEANBA/CITF FT BELVOIR VA  
RUCOGCA/COMNAVBASE GUANTANAMO BAY CU  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02  
FOR THE CJCS  
OPER/ENDURING FREEDOM//  
MSGID/GENADMIN/DJS//  
SUBJ/IMPLEMENTING GUIDANCE FOR RELEASE OR TRANSFER OF DETAINEES  
/UNDER US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTROL TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENT  
/CONTROL ~~(S)~~//  
REF/A/GENADMIN/CJCS/171400ZAPR02/-/NOTAL//  
REF/B/GENADMIN/CJCS/082315ZJAN02/-/NOTAL//  
REF/C/DOC/SECDEF/19JAN02/-/NOTAL//

(b)(1)

PAGE 05 RUEKJCS8002 ~~SECRET~~  
USCENTCOM AOR FOR INVESTIGATING ALL MATTERS PERTAINING TO ALLEGED  
OR SUSPECTED WAR CRIMES, ACTS OF TERRORISM, AND OTHER RELATED  
OFFENSES COMMITTED AGAINST THE UNITED STATES OR US PERSONNEL.//

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

PAGE 06 RUEKJCS8002 ~~SECRET~~

BASIS REASSESS THE STATUS OF EACH DETAINEE AS AN EC, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ANY NEWLY ACQUIRED INFORMATION SINCE CAPTURE THAT MAY BEAR ON THEIR STATUS.

~~(S)~~ THE FOLLOWING IS SECDEF IMPLEMENTING GUIDANCE FOR RELEASE OR TRANSFER OF DETAINEES UNDER DOD CONTROL TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENT CONTROL. QUOTE. IMPLEMENTING GUIDANCE FOR RELEASE OR TRANSFER OF DETAINEES UNDER US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTROL TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENT CONTROL.

(U) REFERENCES

(b)(1)

(U) PURPOSE

~~(S)~~ THIS GUIDANCE IMPLEMENTS THE GUIDELINES FOR TRANSFER OF DETAINEES TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF APRIL 4, 2002 (DOD

PAGE 07 RUEKJCS8002 ~~SECRET~~

DETAINEE TRANSFER POLICY), REFERENCE (A).

(b)(1)

(U) DEFINITIONS

(U) THE FOLLOWING DEFINITIONS ARE APPLICABLE TO THIS



GUIDANCE:

(U) 1. AN "ENEMY COMBATANT" (EC) FOR PURPOSES OF THIS

PAGE 08 RUEKJCS8002 ~~SECRET~~

GUIDANCE IS DEFINED AS ANY PERSON THAT US OR ALLIED FORCES COULD PROPERLY DETAIN UNDER THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR. FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS CONFLICT, AN EC INCLUDES, BUT IS NOT NECESSARILY LIMITED TO, A MEMBER OR AGENT OF AL QAEDA, THE TALIBAN, OR ANOTHER INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATION AGAINST WHICH THE UNITED STATES IS ENGAGED IN ARMED CONFLICT.

(U) 2. "UNDER DOD CONTROL" MEANS THAT THE INDIVIDUAL IS EITHER IN THE PHYSICAL CONTROL OF DOD OR, IF IN THE PHYSICAL CONTROL OF ANOTHER AGENCY, HAS BEEN DESIGNATED BY THE PRESIDENT OR HIS DESIGNEE FOR TRANSFER TO DOD CONTROL.

(U) 3. "RELEASE" IS THE PROCESS BY WHICH AN INDIVIDUAL, WHO HAS BEEN DETERMINED NO LONGER TO POSE A THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES OR US INTERESTS, IS RELEASED TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT WITH NO PROMISE, IN RETURN, FOR CONTINUED DETENTION.

(U) 4. "CONDITIONAL RELEASE" IS THE RELEASE OF AN EC WHO HAS BEEN DETERMINED NO LONGER TO POSE A THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES OR US INTERESTS, UNDER A PROMISE OR AGREEMENT OF THAT EC NOT TO TAKE UP ARMS, OR PARTICIPATE IN FURTHER FIGHTING, AGAINST THE UNITED STATES OR ITS ALLIES IN EXCHANGE FOR FREEDOM.

(U) 5. "TRANSFER" IS THE PROCESS BY WHICH THE CONTROL OF

PAGE 09 RUEKJCS8002 ~~SECRET~~

AN INDIVIDUAL IS TRANSFERRED TO A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT WITH THE PROMISE THAT CERTAIN CONDITIONS WILL BE FULFILLED, USUALLY INCLUDING THE PROMISE OF CONTINUED DETENTION AS AN EC UNTIL RETURNED TO US CONTROL OR UNTIL HIS RELEASE IS AUTHORIZED BY THE UNITED STATES.

(U) PROCESS

(U) UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, WITHIN 90 DAYS OF A DETAINEE BEING BROUGHT UNDER DOD CONTROL, THE DETAINING COMBATANT COMMANDER, OR HIS DESIGNEE, SHALL REVIEW THE INITIAL DETERMINATION THAT THE DETAINEE IS AN EC. SUCH REVIEW SHALL BE MADE BASED UPON ALL AVAILABLE AND RELEVANT INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON THE DATE OF REVIEW AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO FURTHER REVIEW BASED UPON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE OR INFORMATION.

(U) THE DETAINING COMBATANT COMMANDER OR HIS DESIGNEE SHALL PRODUCE A WRITTEN ASSESSMENT REGARDING THE DETAINEE'S EC STATUS BASED UPON HIS REVIEW OF ALL AVAILABLE AND RELEVANT INFORMATION CONCERNING THE DETAINEE. THE REVIEW SHALL BE ADMINISTRATIVE IN NATURE AND SHALL NOT BE DEEMED TO CREATE ANY RIGHT, BENEFIT, OR PRIVILEGE, SUBSTANTIVE OR PROCEDURAL, AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, ITS DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES, OR OTHER ENTITIES, ITS OFFICERS OR

PAGE 10 RUEKJCS8002 ~~SECRET~~

EMPLOYEES, OR ANY PERSON. THE DETAINING COMBATANT COMMANDER SHALL

BE GUIDED BY THE FOLLOWING:

(U) (A) THE DETAINING COMBATANT COMMANDER SHALL CONSIDER ALL RELEVANT AND REASONABLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION, INCLUDING ANY NEW INFORMATION THAT HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED SINCE THE INITIAL STATUS DETERMINATION.

(U) (B) IF NECESSARY TO MAKE A PROPER REVIEW, THE DETAINING COMBATANT COMMANDER MAY INTERVIEW WITNESSES, PROVIDED THEY ARE REASONABLY AVAILABLE AND SUCH INTERVIEWS WOULD NOT AFFECT COMBAT, INTELLIGENCE GATHERING, LAW ENFORCEMENT, OR SUPPORT OPERATIONS.

(U) (C) THE DETAINING COMBATANT COMMANDER MAY, AT HIS DISCRETION, CONVENE A PANEL OF COMMISSIONED OFFICERS TO REVIEW THE AVAILABLE EVIDENCE AND REACH A RECOMMENDED DETERMINATION.

(U) AFTER THE INITIAL 90-DAY STATUS REVIEW, THE DETAINING COMBATANT COMMANDER SHALL, ON AN ANNUAL BASIS, REASSESS THE STATUS OF EACH DETAINEE.

(U) IF, AS A RESULT OF A PERIODIC EC STATUS REVIEW (90-DAY OR ANNUAL), A DETAINING COMBATANT COMMANDER CONCLUDES THAT A DETAINEE MAY NO LONGER MEET THE DEFINITION OF AN EC, THE DETAINING COMBATANT

PAGE 11 RUEKJCS8002 ~~SECRET~~

COMMANDER SHALL IDENTIFY THAT DETAINEE FOR POSSIBLE RELEASE OR TRANSFER AS APPROPRIATE.

(b)(1), (b)(5)



PAGE 12 RUEKJCS8002 ~~SECRET~~

(b)(1), (b)(5)



(b)(1), (b)(5)



(U) RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RELEASE OR TRANSFER, COORDINATED WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AS APPROPRIATE, SHALL BE MADE TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE OR HIS DESIGNEE FOR DECISION.

(U) IN ADDITION TO OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES PRESCRIBED HEREIN, THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY AND RELEVANT COMBATANT COMMANDERS SHALL ASSESS DETAINEES FOR POTENTIAL RELEASE (INCLUDING UNDER CONDITIONAL RELEASE OR OTHER AGREEMENTS) OR TRANSFER ON A COMPREHENSIVE AND ONGOING BASIS.


(b)(1), (b)(5)



A.



(b)(1), (b)(5)



DEFENSE, AND

PAGE 17 RUEKJCS8002 ~~SECRET~~  
~~(S)~~ THE JOINT STAFF.

(b)(1), (b)(5)





(b)(1), (b)(5)

(U) RESPONSIBILITIES  
(U) UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(U) ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS  
AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

(b)(1), (b)(5)


PAGE 20 RUEKJCS8002 ~~SECRET~~

(b)(1), (b)(5)

PAGE 21 RUEKJCS8002 ~~SECRET~~  
(U) DETAINEE POLICY GROUP WITHIN THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF  
DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(b)(1), (b)(5)





(b)(1), (b)(5)

(U) ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
(U) MONITOR THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS ASPECTS OF POTENTIAL AND ACTUAL DETAINEE TRANSFERS OR RELEASES, PROVIDE PUBLIC AFFAIRS POLICY GUIDANCE AS APPROPRIATE IN COORDINATION WITH THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT AND THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, AND PROVIDE COORDINATION OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS MATTERS WITH OTHER FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES AS APPROPRIATE.  
(U) GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(U) DIRECTOR OF THE JOINT STAFF

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(U) COMBATANT COMMANDERS

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(U) SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

(b)(1), (b)(5)

PAGE 07 RUEKJCS8003 ~~SECRET~~

(U) COMMANDER OF THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION TASK FORCE OR  
DOD LEAD FOR CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS FOR THE REGION, WHEN DIRECTED  
BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(U) INTERAGENCY EXPERTS GROUP

(b)(1), (b)(5)


(U) NATIONAL DETAINEE REPORTING CENTER  
(U) WHEN DIRECTED BY THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT, PROVIDE  
INFORMATION ON RELEASE OR TRANSFER OF DETAINEES AS APPROPRIATE TO  
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS.

(U) EXECUTION OF TRANSFER

(b)(1), (b)(5)



(b)(1), (b)(5)





ANNEX A

PAGE 11 RUEKJCS8003 ~~SECRET~~

(b)(1), (b)(5)



PAGE 13 RUEKJCS8003 ~~SECRET~~  
REQUIRED FOR A US CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION OR PROSECUTION.

JS GHOST DOCS 1071

C. WHETHER THE INDIVIDUAL IS OF CONTINUING INTELLIGENCE  
VALUE TO THE UNITED STATES.  
D. LEGAL BASIS TO SUPPORT THE TRANSFER OR RELEASE  
(INCLUDING CONDITIONAL RELEASE).  
E. WHETHER THE PROPOSED DISPOSITION OF THE INDIVIDUAL  
BY THE RECEIVING GOVERNMENT IS ACCEPTABLE AND SUFFICIENTLY RELIABLE  
TO WARRANT TRANSFER. UNQUOTE.  
3. (U) THE JOINT STAFF POINTS OF CONTACT ARE J-5 ARE

(b)(6)

DECL/CLBY: LTG G. W. CASEY, USA; DIRECTOR, J-5; RES: 1.5 (A, B,  
AND D); DECLON: X6//  
BT

SECDEF V2 0  
ACTION (U,8)  
INFO DASD I/O&IS(\*) CHAIRS(\*) CHAIRS TESTBED(\*)  
SECDEF-C(\*) SECDEF-C(\*) C3I DASDI(\*)  
+JCP EMAIL CUSTOMER//CHAIRS//

CJCS V6 3  
ACTION (6)  
INFO CHAIRMAN DISTRIBUTION REQUIRED(\*) SJS-C(\*)  
SJS-C(\*) NMCC:CWO(\*) CMAS(\*) J3(1) CMAS(\*) J5(1)  
J4:LRC(1)

JOINT STAFF V1 10  
ACTION (M)  
INFO J33(1) J5:RUE(1) USSOCOMWO(1) USTRANSCOMWO(1)  
J5:MEAF(1) J2:SPEC(1) J5:DDPMA(1) J5:DDIN(1)  
DELIVER TO USDP:SOLIC CODEWORD OFFICER(2)  
TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 13  
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ZNY ~~000000~~  
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FM CJCS WASHINGTON DC  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC  
RUEADWD/CSA WASHINGTON DC  
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC  
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC  
RHMFISS/CMC WASHINGTON DC  
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC  
RUCAACC/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL  
RUFGCIN/COMUSEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE  
RHMFISS/COMUSEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE  
RUCBACM/CDR USJFCOM NORFOLK VA  
RHMFISS/CDR USJFCOM NORFOLK VA  
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI  
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL  
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL  
RUPEUSA/CDR USNORTHCOM PETERSON AFB CO  
RHCUAAA/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL  
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL  
PAGE 02 RUEKJCS8003 ~~SECRET~~  
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD  
INFO RHEHWSR/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
RUCQSOC/CDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL  
RUFGCIN/USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//ECCS//  
RUCBACM/USJFCOM NORFOLK VA//J3/J33/J34/J2M//  
RUCUSTR/USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE  
RHHMUNA/CDRUSPACOM HONOLULU HI//J3/J33/J34/J7//  
RUCQSOC/USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL//SODC//  
RHCUAAA/USCINTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//TCJ3-J4/TCJ3-OD/TCMD//  
RHMFISS/USCINTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//TCJ3-J4/TCJ3-OD/TCMD//  
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC//G-O/G-OP/G-OPD/G-OPF/G-W//  
RUCBLFB/COMMARFORLANT  
RHMFISS/COMMARFORLANT  
RUCBCLF/COMLANTFLT NORFOLK VA  
RHCUAAA/HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC/CV/DO/LG//  
RHMFISS/HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC/CV/DO/LG//  
RHCUAAA/HQ AMC TACC SCOTT AFB IL//CC/CV/XOO/XOP//  
RHMFISS/HQ AMC TACC SCOTT AFB IL//CC/CV/XOO/XOP//  
PAGE 03 RUEKJCS8003 ~~SECRET~~  
RHCUMAC/HQ AMC TACC COMMAND CENTER SCOTT AFB IL//XOO/XOX/XOS//  
RUEASRB/FORSCOM FT MCPHERSON GA//G3//  
RUEOEGA/CJTF SWA//J3/CC//  
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC  
RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC  
RUEADLA/DLA FT BELVOIR VA//D/J-3/J-341//  
RHMFISS/DLA FT BELVOIR VA//D/J-3/J-341//  
RUCOWCA/COMLANTAREA COGARD PORTSMOUTH VA  
RHMFISS/COMLANTAREA COGARD PORTSMOUTH VA  
RUCKMEA/CG II MEF

RHMFISS/CG II MEF  
RUCOGDI/CJTF GTMO  
RUCOGCA/COMNAVSTA GUANTANAMO BAY CU  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02

OPER/ENDURING FREEDOM//

MSGID/ORDER/CJCS//

REF/A/ORDER/CJCS/202335ZAUG02/-/NOTAL//

REF/B/MSG/CJCS/171400ZAPR02/-/NOTAL//

PAGE 04 RUEKJCS8003-~~SECRET~~

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REF/E/GENADMIN/CJCS/112200ZMAR02/-/NOTAL//

REF/F/GENADMIN/SECDEF/061000ZNOV02/-/NOTAL//

REF/G/GENADMIN/CJCS/211933ZJAN02/-/NOTAL//

REF/H/GENADMIN/CJCS/041800ZAPR03/-/NOTAL//

AMPN~~(S)~~ REF A IS A SECDEF-APPROVED CJCS EXECUTE ORDER (EXORD) DIRECTING CONSOLIDATION OF JOINT TASK FORCE 160 AND JOINT TASK FORCE 170 INTO JOINT TASK FORCE GTMO, ASSUMING THE MISSION OF PREPARING AND OPERATING A DETENTION FACILITY AT NAVAL BASE GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA (GTMO). REF B IS POLICY AND GUIDELINES FOR TRANSFERS OR RELEASE OF DETAINEES TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENT CONTROL. REF C IS DOD IMPLEMENTING GUIDANCE FOR RELEASE OF DETAINEES OR TRANSFER OF DETAINEES UNDER DOD CONTROL TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENT CONTROL. REF D IS ROE SERIAL ONE FOR OEF DETAINEE OPERATIONS. REF E IS MODIFICATION ONE TO ROE SERIAL ONE FOR OEF DETAINEE OPERATIONS. REF F IS PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE FOR RELEASE OR TRANSFER OF DETAINEES IN OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM. REF G IS US GUIDANCE REGARDING STATUS AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES. REF H IS A SECDEF-APPROVED CJCS EXECUTE ORDER (EXORD) MOVEMENT OF DETAINEE  
PAGE 05 RUEKJCS8003-~~SECRET~~

(b)(1)

ORDTYP/EXORD/CJCS//

TIMEZONE/Z//

(b)(1),(b)(5)

AUTHORIZED BY LAW//  
GENTEXT/MISSION/




(b)(1), (b)(5)

3. (U) CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION.

(b)(1), (b)(5)




(b)(1), (b)(5)




4. (U) TASKINGS

(b)(1), (b)(5)




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


(b)(1), (b)(5)




B. (U) COMMANDERS USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, USPACOM, USNORTHCOM,  
USJFCOM.

(b)(1), (b)(5)




(b)(1), (b)(5)





(b)(1), (b)(5)





(b)(1), (b)(5)

5. (U) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

PAGE 04 RUEKJCS8004 ~~SECRET~~

A. (U) C-DAY, L-HOUR. UPON RECEIPT OF THIS ORDER.

B. (U) ROE AND RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE (RUF). CJCS STANDING ROE (CJCSI 3121.01A, DATED 15 JAN 00) AND DOD RUF (DODD 5210.56, DATED 1 NOV 01) AND ROE SERIAL ONE (REF D), WITH MODIFICATION ONE (REF E), OEF ROE FOR DETAINEE OPERATIONS ARE IN EFFECT. ROE SERIAL ONE WITH MODIFICATION ONE, OEF ROE FOR DETAINEE OPERATIONS ARE APPLICABLE FOR DETAINEE TRANSIT FROM GTMO TO DESIGNATED COMBATANT COMMANDERS' AOR AND FOR OTHER INTERTHEATER AND INTRATHEATER TRANSFERS, AS REQUIRED. SUBMIT REQUESTS FOR SUPPLEMENTAL ROE AND/OR RUF AS REQUIRED.

C. (U) DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP JOINT STAFF INFORMED.//  
GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/


6. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

A. (U) AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY IS 1B1. USE OF JOPES IS DIRECTED WHERE APPLICABLE.

B. (U) FUNDING. THE JOINT STAFF WILL NOT PROVIDE FUNDING. TRANSFERRING COMBATANT COMMANDER COMPONENT COMMANDS WILL FUND ALL TRANSFER COSTS. USSOUTHCOM COMPONENT COMMANDS WILL FUND ALL MOVEMENT TO AND FROM GTMO PER REF A. COMBATANT COMMANDER COMPONENT COMMANDS WILL CAPTURE AND REPORT INCREMENTAL COSTS TO SERVICE PAGE 05 RUEKJCS8004 ~~SECRET~~ COMPTROLLERS. SERVICE COMPTROLLERS WILL REPORT INCREMENTAL COSTS TO DFAS-DENVER IAW DOD FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT REGULATION 7000.14R, VOLUME 12, CHAPTER 23, PARA 2308.

C. ~~(S)~~ CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. THIS OPERATION IS CLASSIFIED SECRET.

(b)(1), (b)(5)



8. (U) JOINT STAFF POC IS (b)(6)

(b)(6)

AKNLDG/NO//  
DECL/CLBY: N. A. SCHWARTZ, LT GEN, USAF, DJ-3; RES: 1.5 (A);  
DECLON: X4//  
BT  
SECDEF V2 0  
ACTION (U,7,8)  
INFO CHAIRS(\*) CHAIRS TESTBED(\*) CHAIRS DA(\*)  
SECDEF-C(\*) DOTE(\*) SECDEF-C(\*) ASD:PA-SMTP(\*)  
DIR:PAE-RAM(\*)  
+JCP EMAIL CUSTOMER//CHAIRS//  
+SAFE

CJCS V6 3  
ACTION (6)  
INFO CHAIRMAN DISTRIBUTION REQUIRED(\*) SJS-C(\*)  
SJS-C(\*) NMCC:CWO(\*) CMAS(\*) J3(1) CMAS(\*) J5(1)  
J4:LRC(1)  
TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 3  
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